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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TERRA-PRECARIOUS: FROM PEACE GROWING TO LASTING STABILITY

BY

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Department of Defense

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Terra-precarious: From Peace Growing to Lasting Stability

by

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ABSTRACT

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Terra-precarious: From Peace Growing to Lasting Stability

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This paper asks the question: What can the US do to foster lasting stability in places like *Terra-precarious?* '*Terra-precarious*' is a generic reference to a territory that is chronically afflicted with violent group conflict or humanitarian crises, due to destabilizing political, social or economic conditions. Recent decades saw numerous small conflicts and humanitarian crises. The international community responded with financial assistance, aid programs, value promotion programs, and peace operations. These responses generally failed to remedy root causes of conflict and crises. Consequently, conflict and crises persist and recur. The proposal in this paper is to grow peace, to embrace a Peace Growing program in US National Security Strategy. Peace growing cultivates economic, social and political conditions that foster lasting stability. It does this by means of commercial diplomacy, which is the conduct of commercial activities, on behalf of a government, to achieve diplomatic ends. Peace Growing focuses on economic and civic health in municipalities, inciting values, and peaceful conflict resolution norms while engaged in securing a municipality's economic prosperity.

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TERRA-PRECARIOUS: FROM PEACE GROWING TO LASTING STABILITY

The lights are out again, I hear shooting in the street. My Mama says she remembers when the Americans came here. She never had to move again until she was grown-up. She lived in a town with streets and stores and a movie theater. Before that she lived in *Terra-precarious*. She says that's where we're moving to now. "There will be lots of people marching right along with us", she said. "Everybody's been there before, and this time the whole world is coming ... to watch."

— Terra-precarious: Land of Violence 1

TROUBLE IN TERRA-PRECARIOUS

'Terra-precarious' 2 is a generic reference to a territory or territories that are chronically afflicted with violent group conflict or humanitarian crises, due to destabilizing political, social or economic conditions. Herein, the term is used interchangeably with the terms failed, failing, or collapsed state(s) or terms referring to state subsets like Kosovo. Further, the term is intended to obscure the concept of 'state' and symbolically bolster the notion that stability needs to grow — from neighborhoods.

Recent decades saw numerous small conflicts and humanitarian crises. The international community responded with financial assistance, aid programs, value promotion programs, and numerous peacekeeping missions. However, progress towards stability was often short-lived as the preponderance of crises occurred in areas burdened with destabilizing economic, social or political conditions. Peacekeeping operations did not remedy these underlying causes of crises. They served short-term objectives, such as securing elections. As the root causes of conflict persist, crises continue and recur. Now threats to regional stability exist in many of the same, and a number of new places. The quest for solutions to the problems of *Terra-precarious* has received increasingly more attention since the end of the cold war. The United Nations (UN) heightened concerns in 1992 when the Secretary General called on the international community to address root causes of conflict in the conduct of peace operations. Soon after, the UN resolution for operations in Somalia specifically endorsed the objective of rehabilitating Somalia's political institutions and economy. Those efforts were abandoned and a proven solution for how best to meet the UN call remains elusive. Meanwhile, the small wars and humanitarian crises of recent years are likely to be the most common form of conflict for years to come.

THESIS QUESTION

What can the US do to foster lasting stability in places like *Terra-precarious?* What can be done where violent group conflict or humanitarian crisis is chronic, where conflict and crises persist, and recur?

LASTING STABILITY DEFINED

The way to achieve lasting stability depends upon how it is defined. It also depends on who defines it. It is not an objectively discrete state that all would agree on. It is a point of view, and it is highly influenced by value judgments. Stability as seen through the eyes of an adamant believer

democracy might entail the existence of functioning democratic institutions and adherence to democratic values. This vision of stability would differ greatly from that of someone who values the strength of a benevolent dictatorship or adherence to a certain religion's values. Some might argue that Tito's Yugoslavia was stable. Some might insist that Saudi Arabia is the best example of what stability looks like. In this paper, lasting stability is a function of how human beings deal with conflict in securing their economic well being. It is defined as: a state in which conflict and competition are pervasive; peaceful conflict resolution is the societal norm; and threat of violent group conflict, or humanitarian crises due to destabilizing political, social or economic condition — is non-existent.⁶

PROPOSED SOLUTION

There are many 'ways' that might foster lasting stability. They range from waiting for stability to forcing it. The proposal in this paper is to grow peace. Peace Growing is a program to cultivate economic, social and political conditions that foster lasting stability. It is accomplished by means of commercial diplomacy, which is the conduct of commercial activities, on behalf of a government, to achieve diplomatic ends. It employs a bottom up approach to incite values and peaceful conflict resolution norms, while furthering economic prosperity in municipalities of *Terra-precarious*.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH

In order to evaluate alternative approaches, it is important to understand the lessons learned from approaches up until now. These are reviewed in the section on stability engineering. The section on Peace Growing explores the necessity of a bottom up approach, the benefits of commercial diplomacy, and the advantages of inciting values as opposed to promoting them. It also introduces the concept of Civic-Dynamos to illustrate how commercial diplomacy would foster lasting stability.

STABILITY ENGINEERING

Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security. — Roman strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the threat was not temporary but endless.⁷

In today's world, our enemies are poverty, hatred, illiteracy, human rights abuses, crime, violence, and the host of endless transnational ills that contribute to instability. Where their cumulative affect festers into crisis, grabs the eye of CNN, the hearts of citizens and the interests of nations, a cry to do "something" moves to center stage. Decades of state-focused aid, value promotion, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and now peace building missions failed to produce a successful model for how to achieve lasting stability. This section discusses the complexity of attempting to engineer a stable state, and the uncertain role that value promotion plays in that process. It also reviews current and historical approaches, and addresses implications for the continued application of these approaches in the face of increasing world tensions. In review of these approaches, this section explores the complexity of trying to

engineer stability, the difficulty of promoting values, and the likelihood that today's approach is the solution for the growing number of *Terra-precarious*.

COMPLEXITY

International involvement in the problems of *Terra-precarious* have been top down in approach. They focus primarily on dealings with state governments, sometimes bolstering or restoring a central government's legitimacy. A top down approach entails engineering stability, building stable states as if by means of an equation. Seen as an equation, the generic prevailing ingredients for building a stable state have been military intervention, financial assistance, democratic institutions, and democratic values. However, timing and balancing the introduction of ingredients is extremely complex. Choosing specific forms of ingredients is as well.

Constructing a state entails establishing a central political authority, control over national boundaries, and control over national territory. It also entails building a capacity to extract resources for the state to function, and controlling the actions of state agents to execute policy and limit corruption. There are many variables to choose from in approaching each of these tasks. There are many forms of central political authority, numerous ways to control boundaries, and countless options for configuring economic and governmental norms. Choosing the right blend of ingredients for what Manwaring and Corr refer to as a 'stability equation', is essential to success in engineering stability. Numerous factors complicate the choice of ingredients. Value paradigms are a major influence. Even amongst successful democracies, differing paradigms support differing democratic institutions. Europe's parliamentary systems differ greatly from America's system of state and national congresses. Moreover, success of any choice is contingent upon attributes of society such as skill and educational levels, wealth distribution, fear, hatred, and cultural norms. The degree to which peoples' needs are satisfied, the state of existing infrastructure, geography, climate, and history also influence the outcome of any given choice.

The statistically possible combinations of choices present a grand enigma, in response to which many attempts at introducing democratic institutions or values meet with failure. Many failures result from inopportune timing in introducing stability ingredients. State collapse in the Soviet Union, for example, was in great part the consequence of attempts to implement economic reforms that the country was not objectively prepared to undergo. An inopportune balance in introduction of reforms can also reap devastating results. Such an inopportune balance occurred in Central America when reforms instituted within military forces were out of balance with those instituted within police forces. The imbalance led to a power vacuum within internal security forces that allowed crime to become the primary security threat for the region. Engineering stability remains a highly complex undertaking of uncertain benefit.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

Promoting democratic institutions and values has long been a part of US foreign policy. President Kennedy's value promotion programs in the 1960's targeted essentially the same values addressed in current National Security Strategy (December 1999). Now as before, several US programs promote democratic institutions such as elections, rule of law, civilian control of the military, civil society, human rights, and market economy principles. Similarly, the IMF and the World Bank continue to leverage economic assistance for democratic reforms. Meanwhile, the World Bank now has programs in good governance, effective legal and judicial system, social safety nets and other social programs. Regional multilateral development banks, and even the International Monetary Fund, are taking on non-economic programs like judicial reform or legislative strengthening. Values are essential to lasting stability, but it is important to recognize the questionable results of previous ways to promote them.

Programs to promote democracy have had disappointing results. In some cases, merely holding elections can thwart democracy, in particular in states with unstable governments. For example, "the Sudan in the mid-1980's and Angola in 1993 provide unfortunate examples of countries where attempted democratization accelerated the process of disintegration." Regrettably, although programs may have been influential in the spread of new democracies in recent years, prospects for lasting democracy remain uncertain. For example, crime threatens democracy in much of Latin America and the return of military governments in countries like Niger, Congo, and Sierra Leone dims hopes for the survivability of nascent African democracies. The role of civil society in democratization is equally difficult to predict. An active civil society can advance democracy by fostering citizen involvement, as it does in the US and in India. A strong civil society can also halt rather than strengthen the democratization process as in Sudan where Islamic brotherhoods in the north provoked nationalism is the south, leading to civil war.

Economic reforms imposed by the World Bank and IMF had many devastating impacts. Many new democracies introduced these reforms in exchange for badly needed loans and assistance.

Unfortunately, reforms exacerbated the already serious domestic problems and economic instability in their countries. In Angola, which in 1973 had the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa, reforms led to state collapse. Similarly, reforms were detrimental in the rest of African democracies. Schultz documents the same results and faults reforms for economic instability throughout Latin America. Market principles that work in the US can cripple developing economies. Reforms such as privatizing state functions can worsen unemployment; eliminating tariffs can drove local producers out of business. These democratic experiments were costly, and expected long-term benefits remain illusive while the World Bank continually revises timelines for success of its reform programs. No less disappointing are the results of programs to promote rule of law, police, or military reforms. Programs fail repeatedly and will continue to fail, for they face a lack of will to reform. Carothers makes particular note of the "de facto

legal impunity" enjoyed by the military and economic elite in Latin America. The same lack of will to reform hinders progress in Russia, Cambodia, and elsewhere.²¹

In some places, it may take decades of close involvement to influence change where people experienced a lifetime of ideology opposed to democratic values. In places like Russia, transition to democracy will entail radical changes to social order, moral values, and human relations. The adverse views on market economies and capitalism that the majority of Russians grew up with will not change with the holding of elections or classes on democracy. Nor will the rewrite of legal codes, the banishment of state subsidies or tariffs, the forced separation of warring tribes, and all the aid that money can by, alter a lifetime of contrary learning and accelerate transition to democracy.

EXAMPLE: KOSOVO

UN Resolution 1244 (1999) called for a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of Kosovo. ²³ In response, a multitude of entities is engaged in a comprehensive peace building experiment. The ongoing peace building initiative for Southern Europe provides a good illustration of a comprehensive, multi-national endeavor to engineer stability. It is aimed at achieving lasting stability through multi-year involvement on the part of various national governments, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private industry, and other international organizations. The unfolding de facto stability equation is comprised of the various familiar ingredients of peace experiments past. The equation entails a long-term, multi-national military occupation, and substantial financial and economic development support from the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, NGO, and other institutions. There are programs for development of democracy, civil society, market economies, legal, judiciary, and law enforcement systems based on western rule of law concepts. As in the past, some of these programs are bottom up endeavors, as is some governance support involving community leaders. However, the overall approach remains an aggregate of previous methods and programs.²⁴

Ultimately, the stability equation applied in Kosovo may result in success similar to what the Marshall Plan brought to Europe after World War II. The world would then have the basis for a successful stability equation. There are reasons to doubt near term success in that regard. For example, the problems of hatred and violent conflict continue to be approached as if curable with ingredients like elections or training in democratic institutions and human rights. Moreover, segregation of warring parties has not proven effective in their long-term integration. Nevertheless, the axial question is, will the international community support a comprehensive approach of Kosovo magnitude for every *Terra-precarious*? Will the international community make this level of commitment to long-term military occupation and a massive influx of external funding to the troubled territories of Africa, the NIS or elsewhere? Perhaps. However, given the improbability of that occurrence and facing the growing potential for small wars and humanitarian disaster, what else can be done for *Terra Precarious*?

PEACE GROWING

The Roman Empire — owed its unique longevity to two unusual transformations. The Roman conquerors transformed the conquered into Romans — the Roman conqueror transformed himself by remaking his own civilization in the image of the civilizations of the conquered. Through this dual process of amalgamation, Rome created a new moral and political community — lending stability to the new state. ²⁵

This section introduces the concept of Peace Growing and evaluates its advantages. Peace Growing is a program that employs commercial diplomacy to incite values and cultivate economic, social and political conditions which foster lasting stability. It entails a bottom up approach, with two primary areas of focus. The first focus is on economic health in municipalities of *Terra-precarious*. The second is on societal norms for conflict resolution. Both are equally important.

A BOTTOM UP APPROACH

Hans J. Morgenthau pondered the questions of world peace at a time when two superpowers dominated world events and weapons of mass destruction threatened life itself. He saw a world motivated by the aspirations of sovereign nations for power, in which it was unlikely that struggles would stay within peaceful bounds. In searching for ways to maintain peace amongst states, he explored the factors of stability within states. He found a reaffirmation of Hobbes' message that domestic peace does depend on the state. However, he also found the 'great omission of Hobbes' philosophy', which is that a state can only exist if its people are willing and able to support it. People keep the peace, he noted, under two conditions. First, they must feel greater loyalty to society as a whole, than to any particular part of it. Second, they must expect some modicum of justice and satisfaction of their own demands. Most importantly, he found that the forces that form loyalties and prevent violence stem from citizen participation in a multiplicity of groups and conflicts. Morgenthau's conclusions are fundamental factors in resolving the troubles of *Terra-precarious*.

Corroborative comments are common in foreign affairs literature. Rotermund's recent work includes a lengthy discussion on how essential conflict resolution skills and societal conflict are to stability and peace. Like Morgenthau, he recognizes that common bonds must develop at civic levels and that force cannot create loyalty. Drawing parallels to Kosovo, he argues that a successful counter to nationalism and ethnic hatred lies in creating an environment with a multiplicity of groups in peaceful conflict. He concludes, that peace efforts must focus on local governments, in a bottom up approach. This will require a change to the paradigm in play, which assumes that *Terra-precarians* just do not understand and that what they need, are some courses in democratic values and institutions. The conflict resolution courses offered as part of democratization programs can not effectively target the major barriers to stability — a lack of common and binding interests, the lack of peaceful conflict resolution norms, and economic security. Neither courses nor force can break these barriers. Societal change must be cultivated, and grow organically where people live and work. A bottom up approach is essential to *Terra-precarious* before Hobbes' state can become a stable state.

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Commercial diplomacy is the conduct of commercial activities, on behalf of a government, to achieve diplomatic ends. 'Civic-Dynamo' is introduced as the generic name for a commercial enterprise engaged in commercial diplomacy. In the example in this paper, Civic-Dynamos are the commercial equivalent of a municipality government. Each Civic-Dynamo would have the mission to govern a municipality of *Terra-precarious*, while transforming it into a vibrant economic center.

Morgenthau saw diplomacy as the best means for fostering peaceful conflict resolution in a world community. Extrapolating backwards, and faced with the same issues at a local level, diplomacy offers an appropriate response to the problems of Terra-precarious. Diplomacy is a tool well suited to the conflict resolution and community-building processes needed to bring lasting stability to *Terra-precarious*. Instead of deploying diplomats, however, this diplomatic mission needs to take place through commercial enterprises. This is true for a number of reasons. To begin, there are not enough professional diplomats to move into all the cities and towns of one, never mind many *Terra-precarious*. Nor are there enough military to do the job at the local levels in which the bottom up approach must operate. Ultimately, businesses self-procreate and will always be found in greater supply than military forces will ever be. In addition, economic instability is generally chronic in *Terra-precarious*. Professional and technical skills are required to create thriving economic communities. This is not a job for the military or the career diplomat.

Civic-Dynamos would be funded by government but accountable to the public. Their commercial diplomats would serve as non-discriminatory role models. They would also guard against corrupting influences such as nationalism or ethnic hatred in the work place and in community affairs. Initially, political and diplomatic powers must empower the operation of Civic-Dynamos in *Terra-precarious*. One possibility is that acceptance of Civic-Dynamos be made a condition of funding from the World Bank. Another possibility is that their acceptance be required under the terms of peace agreements. Civic-Dynamos will need political and diplomatic influence to operate where private industry was unable to survive on its own. Favorable trade arrangements are needed. Political and diplomatic power is also required to protect *Civic Dynamos* from taxation (initially), corruption, or other interference by the central government of *Terra-precarious*.

Once in *Terra-precarious*, Civic-Dynamos would control all funds entering their municipality, an essential element of their power and leverage they will need to succeed. This applies to all loans or aid from the US, the World Bank, and from every other source that can be influenced to support the concept. To the extent possible, Civic-Dynamo would hire *Terra-precarians*; at a minimum, all existing civil service employees should be integrated within the organization. Dates for full transfer of operations to *Terra-precarians* should not be mandated; however, Civic-Dynamos should integrate *Terra-precarians* in a manner that fosters evolution to this end. As it is important to establish competing municipalities under different leadership, no one corporation would manage all Civic-Dynamos. It is important that Civic-Dynamos operate like profit-making enterprises, not like governments. Every operation and service needs

to run like a business. Every Civic-Dynamo would maintain a subcontract for professional economic development support. Many US cities have contracts like this to foster and maintain a city's economic prosperity and stability. Initially, professional economic studies are needed to explore sustainable strategies to satisfy domestic consumption needs, secure avenues for exports and funding sources for imports, cultivate trade relationships, and cushion developing economies from world events.

NGO and donor communities are essential partners in success; however, the long-term benefits of their contributions can be enhanced through coordination and effective partnership with Civic-Dynamos. These relationships have great potential to be symbiotic, as Civic-Dynamos can offer NGO a beneficial framework for their operations. However, NGO can also work in ways at odds with critical near term objectives (e.g., clean air versus low energy costs, free trade versus job security at home). Therefore, oversight of their activities is important. Civic-Dynamos would formally evaluate the contributions of donor and NGO programs, and publicize their evaluations. To bolster the leverage Civic-Dynamos have in this regard. US support to NGO would be contingent upon their utility as evaluated by Civic-Dynamos.

Long-term success is essential; however, near term success that makes a difference in the lives of *Terra-precarians* must take precedence in initial years. This requires that Civic-Dynamos have maximum freedom of decision and action within a minimum of regulation and law. Requirements like those imposed by Bretton Woods institutions, that might jeopardize near term success can not be tolerated. In this vein, requiring adherence to prescribed financial accounting standards would be an acceptable requirement. Applying financial leverage to impose rules on matters of subsidies, privatization of industry, tariffs, or other restrictions on foreign trade should not be tolerated. These represent issues that *Terra-precarians* need to resolve in their own interests, and opportunities for conflict experience that are essential to evolving norms of peaceful conflict resolution. They must be allowed their own opportunities to stage demonstrations for and against issues such as World Trade Organization membership. The professional management at Civic-Dynamos can of course influence, and sometimes direct decisions on these matters. However, they should not be constrained by avoidable outside rules. Further, provisions should be made to compensate losers in initial 'hard' decisions of this sort, so as not to disenfranchise them. Civic-Dynamos must have the flexibility they need to adjust course, survive, and succeed.

The need for freedom in the economic realm is true elsewhere as well, in particular with respect to the strict observance of democratic practices. The Civic-Dynamo is in the early years, in part, a safety net. However, it needs to proceed in a manner that will render it a profitable investment and not a charitable cause. Just as in Kosovo and peace operations before it, a need to establish laws and enforce them will be of great importance. However, care is needed to keep laws from jeopardizing near term success of Civic-Dynamos. In particular labor laws and social benefit rules of many western democracies might be totally unaffordable in near term *Terra-precarious*. Early emphasis on elections and political processes may be of little value. Societal bonds must first form on common issues instead of religious, tribal or other concerns. It might be worthwhile to consider starting law with something as close as possible to simply the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.³⁰ Understandably, consequences are

missing there, as are interpretations. The point is, however, that many laws might be either meaningless or harmful before the experiential need for their resolution arises in conflicts between *Terra-precarians*. Again, Civic-Dynamos are there to advise, influence, and if need be direct course.

This brief introduction to commercial diplomacy is not intended to resolve all issues, but rather to illustrate the concept. Many details require further attention. The potential for positive UN involvement, as well as strategies to render the UN harmless must be addressed. Clearly, there are state-level issues to address, solutions to which might also come through commercial diplomacy. Corrupt officials may cause problems if they see their wealth and power threatened. There may be opposition amongst *Terra-precarians*, uneager to accept what they might view as foreign occupation. Incentives and countermeasures will be essential, as will early and visible demonstrations of benefit to local citizens. Police forces are an issue in all peace operations, an issue not resolved in this paper. Hence, Civic-Dynamo may rely on military peace enforcement until a competent police force is in place. Some will undoubtedly denounce commercial diplomacy as an American attempt to impose its culture. This should subside once competing Civic-Dynamos are formed by more than one country.

It is always possible, if not popular, to find plausible cursory arguments against a new idea. Those arguments do not negate the merits or potential of the new idea, but the new idea may need a contract to raise its voice. The business community serves an increasingly influential role in peace operations. For believers in Adam Smith's "invisible hand", the most powerful determinant of ultimate success or failure may rest upon the strength of this community and the freedom with which it operates. The shared knowledge and employment that business can afford a *Terra-precarious* is far more valuable than the democracy training offered in government programs. There are no guarantees of Utopia. However, having motivated and talented commercial diplomats on the ground cannot help but make a difference. Certainly, the promotion of business will do more to improve a local economy than does merely the presence of occupying militaries.

Introducing commercial diplomacy at the conceptual level leaves it open to appearing naïve.

Admittedly, the concept leaves many a skeptics questions unanswered. Nonetheless, when compared to alternatives it also raises supportive questions. Which is preferable, long-term military force to separate warring parties, lining the pockets of corrupt officials, or lining the pockets of accountable business managers?

VALUE INCITEMENT

Peace is not the absence of conflict, rather the dynamic state where many conflicts are ongoing—where learning and differentiation permit the setting aside of cataclysmic war for the day-to-day competition of making a better world; or at least, a better village. 31

This section addresses how commercial diplomacy fosters the state of peace in Rotermund's definition, the foundation for lasting stability. The grand strategy behind Peace Growing is an idealist premise that the more a cooperative social contract takes hold from the bottom up, the more likely it is to become the prevailing approach to conflict at national and international levels. Commercial diplomats can

incite a cooperative social contract. In daily activity, they incite the values of peaceful conflict resolution while demonstrating its worth in furthering a municipality's economic prosperity. Programs aimed at promoting democracy through teaching or financial pressure meet with limited success because, as Carothers notes, "they do not have a decisive effect on the underlying conditions of the society." In other words, for a value to become meaningful, people must experience its affect on their lives.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of commercial diplomacy in furthering lasting stability is in its positive daily influence on societal conflict. Commercial diplomats work at the minor level of daily annoyances, determining the needs of the local mix of cultures, planning for school placements, and otherwise resolving the underlying conditions of their society. They provide a learning environment in which people can see the outcomes of institutions and values applied in practice. Moreover, they are in a position to keep community environments free of corrupting influences that escalate into conflict. These benefits are less likely to accrue where responsibilities for economic development, societal integration, or local governance return too completely or too quickly to any of the parties to a conflict.

On the subject of integration, this country among others has much history and experience to share. When our parents were born, racial issues were a threatening source of violent conflict.

Segregation was a fact. Life is not perfect today, but integration is winning the battle. Integration was in many cases forced in this country; it may need to be forced in *Terra-precarious*. Instead of bussing in Boston, bussing in Bosnia may need to make headlines. In any event, integration will need to begin at home in municipalities. By terms of their contract, Civic-Dynamos would follow the values of a free society at its best. Work place ethics and rules have a normative effect. An enterprise that hires locally can do much to further human rights when it introduces employees to non-discriminatory practices in the workplace. At the same time, it fosters common bonds that cross and are unrelated to ethnic or religious or any other monopolistic allegiance. As Morgenthau noted, people keep the peace under two conditions. First, they must feel greater loyalty to society as a whole than to any particular part of it. Second, they must expect some modicum of justice and satisfaction of their own demands. Justice is a function of the legal system, discussed above. It is also a function of how people are treated in their daily lives and communities. Here again, the Civic-Dynamos play a major role in ensuring the fair treatment of citizens from every walk of their municipalities.³³

SIMPLICITY

There are many advantages of Peace Growing as opposed to enforcing it with a truce, or trying to engineer it top down. Not the least of the advantages is its potential as an alternative in answering CNN driven calls for US responses. Media sensationalism can drive shortsighted decisions that distract our nation from more vital interests and threaten to stretch our national resources, and our military readiness. Commercial diplomacy can simplify the problem of demonstrating concern, with an acceptable alternative to a military response. This in turn would simplify the problem of finding sufficient military to keep or enforce peace in the growing number of conflict zones throughout the world. US military recruiting

problems attest to the difficulty of maintaining sufficient trained and ready forces, for today's mission. Each military commitment to a situation like Kosovo can become an indefinite trial and error experiment, placing even greater demands on military support worldwide. Commercial enterprises, in contrast to military forces, can grow to meet demand more readily.

Peace Growing does not obviate the need for peacekeeping forces. It does provide a civilian organization to assume civilian missions, obviating the need for long-term military presence in support of peace building missions. It provides the solution to the long unresolved concern in military exit strategies concerning transfer of control. Solving the exit strategy in this way alleviates the burden of mission creep and the detriment to war fighting readiness that extended peace operations can cause. Further, peace operations increase demands for civil affairs and combat service support skills. A large measure of these skills resides in the reserves, which have therefore been in abnormally high demand in recent years. An exit strategy that brings in Civic-Dynamos would also alleviate today's burden on the reserves. Further, an overlooked disadvantage of the long-term commitment of military to conflict zones is the message that it sends about civil-military relations. Although technically the military do not perform local government functions, in fact they do serve as a control over civilian government actions. This action sends the subliminal message that civilian control is of high value except when governments somehow fail to succeed on their own. Civic Dynamos resolve this issue.

Peace Growing is anything but simple. It is more complex than engineering stability because it entails managing real chaos, and balancing needs and demands amongst people untamed by the social pressures that are prevalent in western democracies. It is a mission to fix what centuries have not. The ingredients may be present in either approach — force, values, time, and money. In either, it is impossible to predict what the affects of any stability equation will be in any given historical setting. The fundamental difference in complexity is accountability. Stability engineering is a trial and error process of tried and unproven ways, loosely administered by absentee donors from around the world. It is expensive and appears responsive but it may lead nowhere slowly. It is everybody's mission and nobody's job. Its method is hope. In Peace Growing, named and accountable people lead societal change, develop an economy, and balance the instruments and impacts of change daily— toward measurable and visible aims. Its method is control.

CONCLUSION

As events in Kosovo and elsewhere lay bare the illusions of globalization and Full Spectrum Dominance, Americans will awake not to utopia, but to an unruly world in which the United States has assumed vast burdens not easily shed — we will have persuaded ourselves — that — responsibilities and the military power maintained to execute them have become integral not only to our well-being but also to our identity. Denying adamantly that it was ever our intention, America will have become Rome. 34

What can the US do to foster lasting stability in places like Terra-precarious?

The US can embrace Peace Growing in its National Security Strategy. As the Romans faced threats that were not temporary but endless, likewise, the threats of *Terra-precarious* may be endless. They will certainly remain endlessly unstable, without a change — in peace paradigms. Lasting stability in *Terra-precarious* can not be engineered. A top down approach can not grow peace. Decades of promoting democratic values, and leveraging financial assistance to force democratic reforms, did not cultivate the economic, social or political conditions that foster stability. Instead, they often caused harm. Military occupation can enforce a truce, but by itself, it can not force societal loyalty. Today's top down approach can not incite the values that are essential to a societal norm of peaceful conflict resolution. Only a bottom up approach can result in a state in which conflict and competition are pervasive, and peaceful conflict resolution is the societal norm. To cultivate political, social or economic conditions conducive to lasting stability will entail long-term on site support and leadership. Peace Growing offers a direct means to these ends, the elements of lasting stability.

The Roman Empire is the only example in Western civilization of a political structure that came close to being a world state, and outlived its founder. As am empire, it shared Roman culture and it changed Roman culture by amalgamating cultures of its conquests. The common bonds it formed lent it stability. US National Security Strategy (December 1999) proclaims a US responsibility to sustain our role as the most powerful force for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom. Just as forming common bonds is essential for *Terra-precarians* to grow peace, maintaining and cultivating common bonds is essential for the US to sustain peace. The US can cultivate conditions of peace, or continue shaping. The one is a process of amalgamating; the latter is a recipe for separating — warring tribes. Promoting democracy is like waving a paradigm; its flag will not stop the flow of refugees on the road to *Terra-precarious*. Growing Peace can pave the global path to lasting stability.

WORD COUNT = 5862

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Solutions to the problems of failed or failing states tend to focus on their central governments. They address reconstruction of the state or instituting democratic institutions at a national level. The inclusion of this fictional epigraph is intended to focus readers on the bottom up proposal of this paper, from the eyes of an individual who lives in a 'Land of Violence'.
- ² The term *Terra-precarious* is introduced as a generic reference to a place or places in want of lasting stability, where peace operations may be called for. It may refer to a 'state' or to subsets of states in which the UN may sanction intervention, irrespective of state sovereignty. Thus, its use is interchangeable with the terms failed, failing, or collapsed state or terms referring to state subsets like Kosovo. Further, it is a collective noun for any or all of these phenomena. *Terra* is used in preference to the word 'state' because the existence of a state is no longer a prerequisite for military intervention. The term *precarious* is used in preference to adjectives that might imply the disposition of a state (e.g., failed, failing or collapsed).
- ³ Boutros Boutros-Gali, <u>An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992</u> (New York: United Nations, 1992).
- ⁴ Kenneth Allard, <u>Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned</u> (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 18.
- ⁵ Robert H. Dorff, "The Future of Peace Operations," in <u>Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations</u>, ed. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 160.
- ⁶ Manfred K. Rotermund, "The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities," Nov 1999. Available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2000, 9. The definition of lasting stability is based on the definition of peace from the endnote author.
- ⁷ Edward Luttwak, <u>Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire</u> (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 137; quoted by Dr. Roderick R Magee II, eds., <u>Strategic Leadership Primer</u>, (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 1998), 9.
- ⁸ William J. Foltz, "Reconstructing the State of Chad," in <u>Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority</u>, ed. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), 16.
- ⁹ Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, "The Almost Obvious Lessons of Peace Operations," in <u>Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations</u>, ed. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 196.
- ¹⁰ Leonid L. Fituni, "The Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and the Soviet Union," in <u>Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority</u>, ed. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), 144.
- ¹¹ Kimbra L. Fischel, "From Peace Making to Peace Building in Central America: The Illusion versus the Reality of Peace," in <u>Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations</u>, ed. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 33.

- ¹² Thomas Carothers, <u>Aiding Democracy Abroad</u> (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 53.
- ¹³ World Bank Web Site; available from < http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/wbgis.htm; Internet; accessed 2 April 2000.
 - ¹⁴ Carothers, 205.
- ¹⁵ Marina Ottaway, "Democratization in Collapsed States", in <u>Collapsed States: The Disintegration</u> and <u>Restoration of Legitimate Authority</u>, ed. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), 236.
- ¹⁶ Luis Roniger, "Civil Society, Patronage and Democracy," in <u>Civil Society and the Aid Industry</u>, ed. Alison Van Rooy (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd., 1998), 207-220.
 - ¹⁷ Ottaway, 240.
 - ¹⁸ Fituni, 144-157.
- ¹⁹ Donald E. Schulz, "The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future," March 2000; available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm; Internet; accessed 5 April, 38.
 - ²⁰ Ottaway, 247; quoted in Africa Confidential 34 (Jun 11, 1993) 12:2.
 - ²¹ Carothers, 170.
 - ²² Fituni, 144-157.
 - ²³ UN Resolution 1244 (1999).
- ²⁴ "Mission Analysis: International Provisional Administration (IPA) for Kosovo," undated, unsigned. This is a U.S. Department of State (DOS) staff assessment that was prepared to answer requirements of PDD 56. A DOS employee assigned to brief U.S. Army War College students during a field trip to DOS on April 12, 2000 distributed it. Purportedly, the document is in use by U.S. and allied leadership in Kosovo.
 - ²⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 491-492.
 - ²⁶ Morgenthau, Chapter 29.
- ²⁷ Rotermund, Chapter 5. Rotermund suggests that building of local governments in a bottoms-up approach encourages competition at the civic level as a counter-weight to nationalism and other ideologies. The competitive nature reference is page 26 and the argument for local governments is page 36.
 - ²⁸ Morgenthau, Chapter 30.
- ²⁹ Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," <u>Foreign Policy</u> Issue 117 (Winter 1999): 18-30 [database online]; available from UMI ProQuest Direct, Bell & Howell, UMI publication no. 2.

- ³⁰ "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," available from http://cbnet/orgs/usacs1/divisions/pki/human/udohr.htm; Internet; accessed 17Mar 2000.
 - ³¹ Rotermund, 9.
 - ³² Carothers, 341.
 - ³³ Morgenthau, Chapter 29.
- ³⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, "Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives of Globalization," <u>Readings in War, National Policy, and Strategy, Vol. V, Part A,</u>" Department of National Security and Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 151.
 - ³⁵ Morgenthau, Chapter 29.

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